Quantum-based cryptographic protocols are often said to enjoy security guaranteed by the fundamental laws of physics. However, even carefully designed quantum-based cryptographic schemes may be susceptible to subtle attacks that are outside the original design. As an example, we will give a peeking attack against a quantum key distribution scheme based on quantum memory. As a second example, we give an attack against a recently proposed "secure communication using coherent state scheme". Our attack can be used either as a known-plaintext attack or in the case where the plaintext has not been randomized. Our attack requires beamsplitters and the replacement of a lossy channel by a lossless one. It is successful provided that the original loss in the channel is so big that Eve can obtain 2 k copies of what Bob receives, where k is the length of the seed key pre-shared by Alice and Bob. In addition, substantial improvements over such an exhaustive key search attack can be made, whenever a key is reused. Furthermore, we remark that, under the same assumption of a known or non-random plaintext, Grover's exhaustive key search attack can be applied directly to "secure communication using coherent state scheme", whenever the channel loss is more than 50 percent. Therefore, as far as information-theoretic security is concerned, optically amplified signals necessarily degrade the security of the proposed scheme, when the plaintext is known or non-random. Studying those attacks can help us to better define the risk models and parameter spaces in which quantum-based cryptographic schemes can operate securely.
I. INTRODUCTION
"Cryptographers do not sleep well." In conventional cryptography, it is well-known that cryptographic protocols may fail to achieve the designed goals. It is unfortunate that those design flaws are often not fully appreciated by the users until it is too late. A wellknown example is Queen Mary of Scotland whose usage of an insecure encryption scheme to communicate with her conspirators in a plot against Queen Elizabeth led directly to her execution. Another example is the breaking of the legendary German Engima code in World War II by the Allied code-breakers. The Allied code-breaking effort contributed significantly to the outcome of the war and involved a) a number of innovative mathematical discoveries, b) the construction of large-scale code-breaking machines (which were percursors to modern computers), c) the exploitation of a number of mistakes/weaknesses in the implementation details of the German and, finally, d) the capturing of an Engima machine. The first lesson in cryptography is: never under-estimate the effort and ingenuity that your adversaries are willing to spend on breaking your codes. Given that cryptography can be a matter of life and death, there is no surprise that cryptographers are generally paranoid.
Quantum mechanics has made a remarkable entry in cryptography. Unlike conventional cryptographic schemes that are based on computational assumptions, it is often said that quantum-based cryptographic schemes have their security guaranteed by the fundamental laws of physics. Various cryptographic protocols based on quantum mechanics have been proposed in the literature. The best-known protocol is quantum key distribution (QKD). The idea of QKD was first published by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 [1] . It took more than ten years for people to prove rigorously that QKD can, in principle, provide perfect security guaranteed by quantum mechanics [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] . Even in the case of imperfect devices, unconditionally secure QKD is still possible under rigorous theoretical models [9, 10] . Provided that we are willing to be conservative cryptographers, we can adjust the parameters in our experiment so that we have unconditional security proven in a precise physical model, whose validity can then be battle-tested. The battle-testing will hopefully lead to a refinement of our physical model and so on and so forth. Provided that an eavesdropper cannot break our precise physical model at the time of transmission of quantum signals, we can obtain unconditional security.
It is, however, very important to distinguish unconditional security offered by precise physical models from ad hoc security derived from handwaving arguments. Whenever the security of a protocol relies on handwaving arguments, there is serious danger that hidden loopholes may exist in a protocol. The bottom line is that it pays to make our physical model as precise and explicit as possible and it pays to battle-test our physical model in a real QKD system. Indeed, technological advances are intrinsically difficult to predict. What is not realistic today may become realistic tomorrow. Worse still, given that security agencies such as the NSA has numerous mathematicians and physicists working hard on quantum technologies and not all of their results will be published, it is rather risky to assume that ad hoc security will survive their future attacks.
Even carefully designed cryptographic schemes may be susceptiable to subtle attacks that are outside the original design. It would, therefore, be interesting to study those subtle loopholes in existing schemes. In this paper, we will give two examples of new attacks against existing quantum-based cryptographic protocols. The first example is a peeking attack against a QKD protocol based on quantum memory [11] . The second example is a beamsplitting attack against a "secure communication using coherent state scheme" [12] . Our attack applies when the plaintext is known, or more generally, non-random. Furthermore, we remark that, under similar assumptions, Grover's exhaustive key search attack can be applied directly to "secure communication using coherent state scheme", whenever the channel loss is more than 50 percent.
II. PEEKING ATTACK
Biham, Huttner and Mor [11] have proposed quantum cryptographic networks based on quantum memories. In their proposed quantum cryptographic system, multiple users store particles in quantum memories kept in a transmission center. Upon request by users, the center performs a joint measurement on particles stored by two users, thus creating correlations between them. It is a sort of a time-reversed version of an EPR-based scheme. More concretely, suppose there are 10 9 users in a network. Each user shares some authentication information with the center, Charles. Such information allows the center to authenticate the users. Each user initially deposits a sequence of single photons each in one of the four randomly chosen polarization states-vertical, horizontal, 45-degrees and 135-degrees. Suppose two users, Alice and Bob, would like to communicate securely with each other. They inform the center, Charles, to perform a measurement on the sequence of pairs of photons to see whether or not the two particles are in a singlet state. This can be done by measuring the total spin of the particle. If the total spin is zero, the resulting state is a singlet. The center broadcasts the result of its measurement. Alice and Bob throw away the no-singlet pairs. For those pairs that are singlets, Alice and Bob broadcast their bases of preparation. If they have used the same basis, then, for each pair, their polarization should be opposite. As a result, Alice knows Bob's bits and vice versa. However, an honest center, which projects a pair into a single state, has absolutely no knowledge on the value of the bits. For example, if Alice and Bob used the rectilinear basis-vertical or horizontal polarized photons, the center does not know whether Alice's polarization is vertical or horizontal.
Alice and Bob can verify that the center is honest by comparing the polarizations of a random subset of pairs. They check whether, for each pair, the polarizations of the two members are really opposite to each other.
As noted by the inventors, the original proposal is secure if the users prepare their signals in their own laboratories with trusted devices and send those signals over a quantum channel to an untrusted center.
However, it was also suggested in [11] that, "instead of sending them, each user could arrive once in a while to the center, and 'program' his state into the quantum file....". We will now discuss a simple but serious security problem in such a set-up: "peeking attack" during the preparation step. If a user actually comes to a center to program his state, then a dishonest center is at liberty to install sensing devices in his venue. This will allow the center to learn about what states are chosen by a user during the preparation step. For instance, a center may install a hidden video camera to record the motion of the fingers of the user. Alternatively, the center may install sensors in a) either the keyboard or b) the communication link used by the user in the preparation step. Since the center is in full control of the venue, it seems hard to defeat such a peeking attack.
III. BEAMSPLITTING PLUS LOW LOSS CHANNEL ATTACK
The idea of using macroscopic states for quantum key distribution was first proposed by Bennett and Wiesner [13] in 1996. Recently, there has been much interest in the subject of quantum-based cryptographic schemes with coherent states. In particular, Barbosa et al. [12] have described an experimental implementation of one particular scheme which employs mesoscopic coherent states. Such a scheme can be optically amplified and can open up new avenues for secure communications at high speeds in fiber-optic or free-space channels. Just imagine transmitting quantum signals through optical amplifier and one could obtain long distance secure communication.
Let us now describe Barborsa et al.'s scheme [12] in more detail. In [12] , the two users, Alice and Bob, initially share a short k-bit seed key, K. Using a (deterministic) pseudorandom number generator, each of them can expand their seed key, K, which is a classical string, into a longer running key, K ′ , which is also a classical M-ary string. Say,
Suppose Alice would like to transmit some classical data X = (X 0 , X 1 , · · · , X n−1 ), which is an n-bit binary string, to Bob. Then, they use the running key K ′ to encrypt the data X. The transmitted signal is a sequence of quantum states. In order to describe what states are transmitted, we need to introduce some standard states. More specifically, consider M states |α 0 (cos θ l +i sin θ l ) , where θ l = 2πl/M. Note that, for each even M, they form M/2 pairs {l, l + M/2}. Each pair forms a signal set. The two signals of each pair are almost orthogonal for a large α 0 . In fact, the inner product between any two signals in a pair is exp(−2|α 0 | 2 ). Barborsa et al.'s scheme [12] considers the scenario when M ≫ α 0 so that the M states are not (almost) distinguishable. Each component, say K ′ i , of the running key is used to specify which one of the M bases is used for encoding the data bit, X i . Indeed, the transmitted state is of the form |Y 0 ⊗|Y 1 ⊗· · ·⊗|Y n−1 where
If an eavesdropper has no information on the running key K ′ , then it might appear that she cannot do much better than random guessing.
Instead of considering a ciphertext only attack as originally studied in [12] , we consider either a known-plaintext attack or the case where the plaintext has not been randomized. Known-plaintext attacks were employed successfully against both the Germans and the Japanese during the Second World War. We will discuss a simple theoretical attack that can break such a scheme with a known or non-random plaintext. It involves beamsplitters and the replacement of the original high loss channel by a low loss channel. Our observation is the following: By replacing a high loss channel by a low loss channel, an eavesdropper obtains many copies of the output state received by the receiver, Bob. In principle, she can use beamsplitters to split the signal, sending one copy to Bob and keeping many copies herself. Now, Eve is at liberty to perform an exhaustive key search to break the enciphering scheme, in analogy with exhaustive key search attack in conventional cryptography. [Note that such an exhaustive search attack is possible if the plaintext is known or, more generally, not random.] Useful improvements over such an exhaustive search attack will also be presented.
Let us begin with an exhaustive search attack. More concretely, suppose the loss of the channel is such that only a fraction 1/(t + 1) of the quantum signal reaches Bob. Then, by replacing a lossy channel by a lossless one and intercepting the residual signal, Eve can obtain t copies of the signal received by Bob. In the spirit of exhaustive key search, for each copy of the signal, Eve can try to decode it with a specific trial value for a seed key. In more detail, She picks a trial value K = K trial i for the seed key and runs a pseudo-random generator to obtain a running key K ′ trial i . With such a running key in her hand, she can then measure a copy of the signal to try to determine the value of X. Note that if she has guessed the value of the seed key correctly, she will most likely obtain the correct value of X from her measurement.
Our attack applies to two cases-as a known-plaintext attack or the case where the plaintext has not been randomized. Consider case one: known-plaintext attack. As in standard cryptography, we are given
The eavesdropper's job is to deduce k or an algorithm that will infer P i+1 from C i+1 = E k (P i+1 ). Known-plaintext attacks allow the eavesdropper to verify that she has guessed the correct encryption key. In case two, the plaintext, X, is not known. However, we assume that it is not randomized. Suppose X is a text in English, there is a lot of redundancy in the message. Eve will be able to verify that the message is in English. On the other hand, if her trial value K = K trial i for the seed key is incorrect, then it is highly unlikely that she will find that the decoded message is a meaningful English text. In summary, she will be able to tell whether a trial seed key is correct or not simply by seeing whether the decoded message is meaningful or not. Now, suppose the number t of copies in Eve's hand satisfies t ≥ 2 k where k is the number of bit of the seed key. Then, Eve could have tried all possible combinations of the seed key. Therefore, Eve will have succeeded in breaking the security of the scheme completely. This conclusion applies to both cases (case one-known-plaintext attack and case two-where the plaintext is unknown, but not randomized).
Some remarks are in order. First, our attack may be outside the original design of the protocol. The original design of the protocol [12] seems to focus on ciphertext only attacks.
Second, our attack appears to be feasible with current or near future technology: Since installed fibers may go through many intermediate switches, they may not take the shortest path between the sender and the receiver. Therefore, it is not unrealistic to imagine that the eavesdropper may re-route the original optical path to a shorter one, thus effectively reducing the loss in the channel. Besides, low loss fibers are under active development in various laboratories in the world [14] and they give much lower loss than standard Telecom fibers through which QKD experiments are usually performed. Therefore, Eve may apply those low loss fibers for eavesdropping purposes.
For an eavesdropping attack that involves re-routing the light through a shorter path, it may lead to a different time delay in the channel. Therefore, Alice and Bob may try to defeat it by testing the transmission time. However, such a testing by Alice and Bob may be defeated by a technologically advanced Eve: Given that there have been successful "stopping light" experiments [15, 16] , we think it may not be unrealistic to believe that Eve might be able to reproduce the same transmission time by delaying the light pulses only temporarily in the near future. Therefore, detecting the transmission time may not be sufficient to defeat our attack.
Third, when Alice is sending a long message to Bob, Eve may not even need that many copies of the signal to decode it. To illustrate this point, let us consider, for simplicity the case when the plaintext is a message of the form, P 1 P 2 · · · P r where P i is s-bit long and rs = n. In fact, we allow Alice to divide up her transmission of the message into r different time windows. For instance, P 1 might be transmitted on the first day (or hour or minute), P 2 on the second day, ..., P r on the r-th day. We assume that Eve has no long-term quantum memory (but is able to use beamsplitters and measure mesoscopic signals). Once again, let us assume that P i is a text in English or is a known plaintext. Suppose the channel is lossy and only a fraction 1/(t + 1) of the signal reaches Bob. Then, effectively, Eve has t copies of all the r messages, X i in some encrypted form in different time windows. Altogether, Eve has rt encrypted messages. Now, Eve can try a different trial seed key value K trial i for each of the rt messages. Therefore, provided rt ≥ 2 k , Eve will succeed in an exhaustive key search and find the encryption key, k. From that point on, she will be able to infer any future message P r+1 from its ciphertext E k (P r+1 ). Note that for an fixed transmission fraction 1/(t + 1), for a sufficiently large r, the scheme will become insecure. This sets a fundamental limit on how many times Alice and Bob can expand a key before the scheme becomes insecure against a "beamsplitting plus exhaustive key search attack".
Fourth, Eve can substantially increase the power of an exhaustive key search attack by changing the value of her trial seed key mid-way in the decoding process. In fact, for each encrypted copy of a message, X i , she may first try a trial seed key value, K trial i on the first few bits of the ciphertext. She checks whether the decrypted message is a meaningful text in English. If it is, she will continue the decryption process for a few more bits and checks again and so on and so forth. On the other hand, whenever it becomes clear that the decrypted part of the message is not a meaningful text in English, Eve can change her trial seed key value from K trial i to another value, say K trial j . She decrypts a few bits and sees if the resulting text makes sense. If it does not, she can change the trial value of the trial seed key again. The process is done until she is fairly confident that she has found the right trial seed value.
We remark that one countermeasure that Alice and Bob can use to circumvent this particular improved attack is to perform double encryption. The message P i should be encrypted by a standard classical cipher like AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) before passing through a quantum-based encryption device.
Fifth, if Eve has a quantum computer, then she can launch a much more powerful attack. Indeed, she will be able to decode the message with high probability whenever the transmission ratio of the channel is less than 50 percent. The idea is that Eve can perform a Grover's database search on the encrypted message to see whether she has found a correct key. See [17] for details. Even though the ciphertext is a quantum state, we remark here that, in the context of known-plaintext attacks, such a quantum exhaustive key search method by Grover can be applied directly to [12] . Furthermore, only one plaintext-ciphertext pair will be sufficient for performing Grover's search. Therefore, it is sufficient for Eve to have a single copy of the signal. This implies that the scheme is, in principle, insecure against a known-plain quantum computing attack, whenever the transmission ratio is less than 50 percent.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In summary, two attacks against quantum-based cryptographic schemes are discussed in this paper. The first attack can be used to defeat a quantum cryptographic network proposal based on quantum memories. The original proposal allows the users come to an untrusted center to prepare some quantum states in quantum memories. We make the observation that an untrusted center can install sensors (e.g. video camera or key stroke sensors) to read off the classical choice made by the users. Such a "peeking attack" is a legitimate concern.
The second attack can be used to defeat a communication protocol based on mesosopic coherent states. Such a scheme can be optically amplified. Our attack applies if a plaintext is known or, more generally, not random. We remark again that known-plaintext attacks were successfully launched against both the Germans and the Japanese in World War II. Our attack involves replacing a high loss channel by a low loss channel and using beamsplitters to steal a component of the signal. Therefore, our attack can be implemented with current technology. Once Eve has copies of the quantum signal, she can perform exhaustive key search on her copies to find out the value of the key. Moreover, she can improve substantially over a simple exhaustive key search by exploiting redundancies in the plaintext, unless double encryption has been performed. In fact, given any transmission ratio 1/(t+1) of the channel, the scheme will become insecure whenever a seed key is expanded more than r times where rt ≥ 2 k . Furthermore, if Eve has a quantum computer, she can apply Grover's database search algorithm to attack the scheme. Such a quantum-computational attack will work whenever the loss of the channel is over 50 percent.
We remark that it will be interesting to look into attacks that require technologies intermediate between simple beamsplitters and a full quantum computer.
As a general remark, breaking cryptographic systems is as important as building them. Our attacks are rather simple but powerful. They highlight that, just like their classical counterparts, the study of the security of quantum-based cryptographic schemes is a very slippery subject. It is important to make security assumptions as explicit as possible.
In summary, our attacks highligh the fact that even carefully designed cryptographic schemes may still be susceptible to attacks outside the original design. Understanding those attacks will thus be helpful to improving the security of those schemes, for example, by better defining the parameter space or risk models in which those schemes are secure.
Finally, we remark that our attacks do not apply to BB84 [1] or other standard QKD schemes where the key is not re-used and there is no central server.
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